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Social Comparison and Persuasion
Processes in Health Communications

Jerry Suls and Kathryn Bruchmann

Abstract
Two basic social processes, persuasion and social comparison, have figured prominently in the
development and implementation of health communications since the early 1950s. This chapter
reviews relevant theory and evidence from basic persuasion and comparison research to demonstrate
the centrality of the self-concept for understanding changes in personal belief, opinion, self-efficacy,
and behavior change. Then, selective evidence and implications from health communications research
are reviewed: Interventions using self-affirmation; gain-loss framing and graphic warning labels/fear
appeals from the persuasion area; and interventions using normative provision, social comparison
interventions, and support groups from the comparison area. In the final section, personalized,
tailored health-communication approaches that capitalize on both persuasion and comparison
paradigms are described. For intervention and public-policy purposes, it is recommended that
communications that increase personal relevance, cognitive elaboration, and assimilation to health
role-models have the strongest potential for creating lasting health behavior change.
Key Words: social comparison, persuasion, elaboration likelihood, self-affirmation, gain-loss framing,
proxy model, self-efficacy, tailored communications, fear appeals

In health communications, people are urged
co engage in physical exercise, maintain nutritious
and appropriately sized diets, obtain inoculations,
avoid cigarettes, undergo screening procedures and
take recommended medications. In the_early 1950s,
social psychologists, whose specialties were in attitude measurement and persuasion, were among the
first behavioral scientists to consider the best ways to
design and disseminate health communications to
inform and persuade the public to adopt healthyand avoid unhealthy-practices. As basic social psychology has adv~nced, its contributions to health
communication also have expanded. Additionally,
the means by which health messages are communicated have grown from just face-to-face, magazines,
newspapers, billboards, or radio to include television, social media, and the Internet.

This chapter describes how knowledge about
basic social psychological processes has informed
the development and application of effective health
communications. The coverage will be selective and
focus mainly on two core social psychological areas
that frequently work in tandem: persuasion and
social comparison processes.

Defining Terms and
Describing Overlap
Persuasion refers to the process whereby written
or spoken words are used to communicate information, feelings, and/or reasoning toward some event,
idea, object, or other person(s) (Sei rer & Gass,
201 O). Pacts, argumenrs, and testimonials are used
to sway opinion. Social comparison is defined as the
process of thinking about information about one or

more other people in relation to the self. Relative
standing can be informative about what one is capable of doing and whether one's personal opinions
and beliefs are correct (Festinger, 19 54a&b; Wood,
1996). 1he comparison process is assumed t~ operate mainly when people do not have objective
information available to gauge their standing and
uncertainty is high (cf. Klein, 1997). Comparison
can be a deliberative process, but it can also occur
unconsciously or implicitly. Persuasion arid comparison are usually treated as distinct processes, but
they need not be.
One common scenario that combines persuasion and comparison occurs when one learns the
results of an opinion poll, overhears someone state
his or her view, or infers another person's opinion
from overt behavior. Under these circumstances, it
would be surprising that comparison of one's personal views with another person would not occur,
at least implicitly. Even in the absence of supporting
information or arguments, mere exposure to another's person position on some issue may be sufficient
to induce attitude change, or, if one learns one's
opinion is shared, bolster confidence. Persuasion,
on the other hand, involves not just learning about
some person, group, or organization's opinion (i.e.,
level of agreement or disagreement), but also being
exposed to facts and arguments that sustain their
position.
Comparison may be integrally connected to
persuasion when the communication source's relative standing with the target audience on relevant
attributes is salient. For example, while listening to
a political appeal, a message is generally more persuasive when it comes from someone of the same
political party (e.g., Brock, 1965). Similarly, a common assumption is that a persuasive message from
a person who is similar to the audience in gender,
age, or life experience, lends credibility to the content of the communication. These examples provide
a preliminary illustration of the interconnectedness of persuasion and social comparison. This is
a common occurrence in health communications,
although, in some cases, the social comparison elements are implicit and unacknowledged. This chapter will further parse the relationships between these
theories in health communications.

Lessons from Persuasion
In the earliest days of persuasion research, attitude
change was conceptualized in terms of learning theory or information processing. 1he Yale approach,
led by Carl Hovland, proposed that persuasion is
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contingent on a sequence of stages: attention, cornprehension, learning, acceptance, and retention of
the information in a communication (Hovland
Janis, & Kelley, 1953). A persuasive appeal is sue~
cessful to the extent that the message and its conclusion were attended to, understood, accepted, and
later recalled (McGuire, 1968).
Laboratory-based research involved testing
manipulations thought to be relevant for particular
information processing stages. For example, source
credibility can be relevant to all stages, whereas
comprehension seems especially affected by the
complexity of the message. Health communicators
initially adopted manipulations found to be successful in laboratory research, such as source credibility
and incentives for adopting recomm~ndations.
One type of incentive, based on fear-based conditioning, was borrowed from learning theory.
Fear was conceptualized as a drive state motivating
trial-and-error behavior to reduce the drive (e.g. ,
Janis, 1967). In persuasion, fear arousal was presumed to enhance message acceptance when the
message also prompts mental rehearsal of the recommended precaution that reduces the fear Ganis,
1967). For example, a campaign might provoke fear
by describing a threat to which the target is susceptible (e.g., depictions of serious automobile accidents),
followed by description of safety conditions produced by protective action (e.g., "always buckle-up
to reduce the risk of serious injury"). In amended
form , this idea is the basis for contemporary public
campaigns in Europe and the United States featuring graphic warning labels on cigarette packs (e.g.,
Hassan, Shiu, Thrasher, Fong & Hastings, 2008),
which will be discussed in more detall late'r.
Although attitude change conceived as a learning phenomenon was the foundation for extensive
research and provided supportive evidence for the
use of several persuasion strategies, the approach
had limitations. Researchers studying fear-based
appeals found that high levels of fear may instigate
defensive processes, such as derogation of the communication source or denial of the message content,
and thereby often were ineffective. Fear was effective
only when the audit:nce had a viable and available
plan or strategy to control the danger (Leventhal,
Singer, and Jones, 1965).
Notably; the premise of the Yale approach char
persuasion produces new learning was not strongly
supported. For example, the amount of information
presented in the persuasive message that the target
can recall tends to be poorly correl~ted with degree
of attitude change (Petty, Ostrom, & Brock, 1981).

f\lso , some influence targets attend and comprehend rhe message and change their minds, whereas
ocher targets also attend and comprehend, but clo
not change. These results do not provide strong
support for the learning or information-processing
framework.
Among contemporary social psychologists, there
is consensus that it is not merely the information
that people attend to or comprehend but also what
they cognitively "do" with the information that
affects the degree to which persuasion occurs. In
other words, persuasion depends on how the content of a persuasive message is cognitively processed,
an insight that forms the basis of the influential
elaboration-likelihood model of persuasion (ELM;
Pet[)' & Cacioppo, 1981). For ELM, how motivated and able people are· to assess the central merits
of an issue or a position is the critical element. Some
motivational and ability variables are part of the
persuasion situation, whereas others are individual
atrribuce ·. The more motivated and able people are
to assess the merits of an issue or position, the more
likely they are to effortfully scrutinize issue-relevant
information.
When elaboration likelihood is high, people will
thoughtfully assess the communication in relation
to knowledge that they already possess and arrive
at a reasoned attitude that is well-articulated and
bolstered by supporting information. Deliberative
cognitive processing may elicit thoughts supportive
of the message, but also be met with self-generated
counterarguments. The predominance of supportive thoughts over counterarguments will determine
whether the message is persuasive. This is considered the central route of persuasion. When elaboration likelihood is low, information scrutiny is
reduced and attitude change can result from less
resource-demanding processes that do not require
as much effortful evaluation; this is referred to as the

peripheral route ofpmuasion.
Attitudes that are changed by low (rather than
high) effort are assumed to be weaker and have less
impact on behavior than attitudes that are changed
the same extent by high effort. Whereas high elaboration may involve careful deliberation about the
accuracy and reasonableness of the facts and arguments presented in the message, low elaboration
involves the use of peripheral cues; for example,
simply counting the number of arguments and
assuming that with "so many arguments, it must be
good," or that if a physically attractive source advocates the product, "it must be worth purchasing"
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1984).

An important variable affecting an individual's
motivation to "elaborate" is the perceived personal relevance or importance of the communication (Petry & Cacioppo, 1979; 1986; Johnson &
Eagly, 1989). When the issue's personal relevance is
high, people are more influenced by the substantive
arguments in a message and are less impacted by
peripheral cues, such as source attractiveness (e.g.,
Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). There also
are individual differences in people's motivation
to think about persuasive communications. Those
who enjoy thinking are described as being high in
"need for cognition"(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), and
tend to form attitudes on the basis of the quality of
the arguments in a message rather than on peripheral cues (see Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983).
There is a long list of relevant persuasion variables
identified by attitude researchers, such as source
credibility, message complexity, and message repetition, but the persuasion topic's personal relevance
appears to be the superordinate construct. Topic relevance is defined by the self-concept-the personal
attributes and issues an individual considers to be
self-defining, the life domains that are most dear
and desirable goals and aspirations. When a persuasive message has resonance for the self-system, then
deliberative cognitive processes are set in motion.

Fea1·-Appeals Redux
Because threat or fear figures prominently in
health communications, it may be worthwhile to
consider the way current attitude researchers think
about them. To anticipate our argument, the self also
has a prominent role. Several reviewers observe that
fear per se does not distinguish between effective and
ineffective interventions (Fisher & Fisher, 1992).
This may be because fear triggers two qualitatively
different motivational processes (Leventhal, 1970).
First is fear control, which involves reduction of a
threat through derogation of the source and defensive processes, such as denial. However, this kind of
control does nothing to actually lessen the threat.
Danger control, the second process, elicits cognitive
processes to instigate protective actions to actually
avoid the threat. Fear control and danger control
can act independently or in tandem (Leventhal,
1970). The protection-motivation model (Rogers,
1975) posits that danger control consists of a threat
apprai al component ("how serious and how personally susceprible am I") and a coping appraisal
(assessment of effectiveness of potential responses
[outcome expectancies] and personal ability to
perform actions successfully) (Maddux & Rogers,
SULS, BRUCHMANN
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1983; Rogers, 1975; see also Witte, 1992; Witte &
Allen, 2000).
In the absence of feelings of outcome-efficacy
and self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986), threat induces
fear control rather than precautionary behavior.
However, with appropriate reassurance that there
are actions that can prevent the dire event and the
belief that one is capable of such actions, then precautionary behavior (i.e., danger control) should
follow (Ruiter, Kok, Verplanken, & Brug, 2001).
The role of susceptibility, outcome-efficacy and
self-efficacy demonstrated in fear appeals dovetails
with the more general idea that persuasion and
behavior change require the engagement of the
self-system. If the message recipient believes the
personal susceptibility to injury or illness is negligible, then the message has little personal relevance.
If there is no potential precautionary action or if
self-efficacy is perceived to be low, then the precautionary action is unlikely.
Attitudes and Behavior. ELM researchers have
been most concerned with persuasion and attitude change and less with the relationship between
attitudes and behavior (the conspicuous exception
being the idea that central processing is more likely
to have greater impact on attitudes and subsequent
behavior). The most influential explanation for the
attitude-behavior relationship is Ajzen's Theory
of Planned Action (TPA; Ajzen 2001; Ajzen &
Fishbein 2005), which postulates that behavior
follows from both behavioral intentions and perceived control over behavior. Intentions are derived
from considerations of attitudes, subj ective norms
(i.e., what relevant referent groups support), and
perceived behavioral control (i.e., self-efficacy).
A meta-analysis showed that intentions explained
a significant portion of variance (18%) in subsequent behaviors, and subjective norms were the
weakest predictor (13%) (Armitage & Conner,
2001). Another meta-analysis found that intentions only predicted 28% of the variance in actual
behavior leaving much that is not accounted for;
however, few studies have assessed actual behavior
(Sheeran, 2002).
An implicit assumption of .sume researchers is
that the constructs in the TPA operate sequentially
(with perceived control following the other constructs). However, concerns about poor outcomes
or low self-efficacy may give rise to counterarguments even during initial processing of a persuasive
message. People often can quickly discern the implications of changing their opinions for suhsequent
action. This means that assessing self-efficacy as low
254
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while the persuasive message is cognitively processed
may place the brakes on the ongoing elaboration of
the message. This is consistent with the idea that
there are several evaluative mechanisms that operate relatively independently (Giner-Sorolla, 1999;
Ito & Cacioppo, 2001); the processing of attitude
objects can occur at lower, more automatic levels,
whereas higher-level processing can focus on other
features of the attitude. Because there is a natural
tendency to protect the self-system, the individual
may automatically "move ahead" to questions, such
as "am I capable to preventing this threat?" even
before the entire message has been read or heard.
If the individual perceives low self-efficacy, then
processing of the message may be short-circuited by
counterarguing with the message points and/ or derogating the source. This means that outcome expectancies and self-efficacy are relevant to virtually any
persuasive message that has personal relevance-not
just those eliciting fear.

Lessons from Social Comparison
Social comparisons can involve an unlimited
range of domains, from personal income and physical attractiveness to physical health and political
pre,ferences, but comparisons only have impact
when they serve self-evaluation or self-enhancement.
Self-evaluation (Festinger, 1954a&b) refers to people's desire (a) to know what they are capable of
doing (i.e., ability) and (b) to hold beliefs and values
that are correct. Comparisons with peers, role models, and norms can provide such information. In the
health domain, comparison provides information
about medical risks, identifies behaviors that are
health-promoting and health-damaging, and clarifies whether the individual has sufficient ability to
perform the requisite behaviors. Self-enhancement
refers to the desire to feel better or protect oneself from the consequences of threatening information (Wills, 1981; Wood, Taylor & Lichtman,
1985). This motive is relevant to health because
the occurrence or prospect of personal illness and
its consequences are inherently threatening to the
physical and psychological well-being of the self
As described later, strategic inco(pomtion of social
comparison information in healrh communications can buoy ·elf-esteem to facilitate the mar haling of personal L"C ·ources, coping, and adoption of
health-promotive behaviors.

Self-Evaluation
For sel f-1.:valuation, comparison tends to be
with someone who is similar to an individual on

attributes related to and predictive of the dimension to be evaluated (referred to as related attributes).
1hus, a patient gauging his or her physical health
status should seek a comparison standard with
paricnrs with the same disease, of rhe same age,
uender, height, and weight and chose who engage
"i_n imilar health practices. The pacienr ought to
function about the same as this comparison standard, but if functioning better than the standard,
the patient can infer better health. Comparing
along related attribute dimensions allow us to get
a better understanding of our personal situation
(Goethals & Darley, 1977).
Some times, however, people want to know more
than simply that they are in good or poor health, but
what they are capable of achieving ("Can I do X?).
For example, chronic illness patients want to know
whether they will get better or worse: "Can I return
co my 40-hour a week job?" "Am I again able to
play sports with my children or peers?" and so on.
One way to answer such questions is to compare
with someone-referred to as a proxy-who seems
to have a similar level of ability and who has already
succeeded at the task (Wheeler, Martin, & Suls,
1997). If people have the same amount or more
ability than the proxy does, they can conclude with
some confidence that they could also do as well.
There are two ways that people can be confident that they have as much potential as the
proxy: (a) they previously have fared as well as the
proxy at his best, or (b) they observed how well
the proxy is doing and are similar to the proxy on
attributes related to their physical and psychological well-being. In either scenario, they can establish
with some certainty that they are similar in ability
to the proxy and thus should have the same action
possibilities. For example, finding a proxy who also
has the same physical illness, about the same age,
background, etc., and successfully returned to work
a few weeks after hospital discharge.
Questions about health status and chances of
recovery are important, but laypeople and patients
also have uncertainty about medical procedures,
medications, and other health-related matters that
can be answered via comparison. In opinion comparison, it is useful to distinguish between beliefs,
which refer to verifiable facts, and values, which are
personal preferences (Goethals & Darley, 1977).
Whereas comparisons with similar others on related
attributes, such as background and general worldview, can serve for value assessment, someone who
is dissimilar or, in particular, someone who is superior on related attributes (conferring more expertise)

should be more informative about beliefs. Since few
facts are completely value-free, someone who has
more expertise and also shares the same basic values
(i.e. , world view) is probably most preferred. Such a
person can be considered as a "similar expert" (Suls,
Martin & Wheeler, 2000). There is also a third type
of opinion, which concerns predictions about subjective responses to future situations (e.g., "Will
I like my new physician?"). We can predict our
likely future response to a new physician by learning about a proxy's response to the same physician
if proxy shares related attributes or past pattern of
agreement about medical doctors.

Self-Enhancement, Contrast,
and Assimilation
The kinds of comparisons just described are
driven by epistemic need, but as noted earlier, they
also can be hedonically driven. A popular theory,
downward comparison theory (Wills, 1981), proposed that, under threat, people will prefer to compare with others who are worse off to feel better
about themselves. Subsequent research showed
that medical patients, who presumably experience
threat, seemed to benefit from downward comparisons (i.e., with patients worse-off) (Wood, Taylor &
Lichtman, 1985). This was presumably because the
contrast effect (i.e., displacement from a worse-off
target) produced a positive change in feelings about
the self (e.g. , Morse & Gergen, 1970). Conversely, if
someone is exposed to an upward comparison (i.e.,
superior other), then feelings should be contrasted
or displaced downward, and create worse feelings
about one's standing (Wheeler & Miyake, 1992).
With the accumulation of more evidence, we
know receipt of downward comparison does not
always lead to positive feelings via contrast. In fact,
we know that comparison also can lead to assimilation, that is, displacement of feelings toward the target (e.g., Brown, Novick, Lord, & Richards, 1992;
Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen & Dakof, 1990;
Collins, 1996; Suls, Martin & Wheeler, 2002). This
means that there are four possible outcomes of social
comparison: upward contrast (i.e., negative feelings
from feeling different and inferior), upward assimilation (i.e., positive because one may improve and
become more like the comparison other), downward contrast (i.e., positive because one is different
and better than the other), and downward assimilation (i.e., negative because one identifies with the
inferior other and is concerned about faring poorly
oneself). What factors determine which particular
outcome follows social comparison?
SULS, BRUCHMANN
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The theory of selective accessibility (Mussweiler,
2003), based on concepts from the social cognition literature, provides a plausible and coherent
explanation. At the moment of exposure to a novel
stimulus, people make rapid, holistic impressions
based on salient features. In the comparison scenario, a person makes a tentative and rapid judgment of similarity or dissimilarity to the (superior
or inferior) comparison target. Salient features
(such as gender, race, or age) of the comparison
target determine this initial impression. Then, the
person searches for information consistent with the
preliminary judgment (or hypothesis) of similarity
or dissimilarity. Whether one searches for similarity information or dissimilarity information, it is
easy to find information that is consistent because
self-concepts are remarkably rich and complicated.
That information then becomes selectively accessible when we make judgments about ourselves.
If we have searched for information that we are
similar to the standard, we are likely to assimilate our self-evaluations toward the target. If we
have searched fo r information that we are dissimilar to the target, we are likely to contrast our
self-evaluations away from the target.
Contrast is more likely if the standard is extreme
or unattainable, or if the standard belongs to an
out-group, both of which would lead to an initial
hypothesis of dissimilarity. Assimilation is more
likely to occur if there is psychological closeness with
the standard, which would lead to a search for similarity. The selective accessibility model (SAM) is elegant and explains a wide variety of empirical results;
however, a shortcoming of the model is that it does
not explicitly recognize that self-enhancement or
protection may bias comparisons. For example,
there is abundant evidence that people assimilate
upward, but there is almost no evidence of true
downward assimilation (Wheeler & Suls, 2007).
Although SAM would argue that upward and
downward assimilation are equally likely, SAM
could be modified slightly and state that one would
not search for similarity with a downward standard
because of self-esteem concerns;
In brief, (1) relative standing is discerned with
related attributes in mind, (2) estimating what one's
potential (i.e., self-efficacy) is depends on finding
an appropriate proxy (similar in related attributes
and already attempted "X"), and (3) assimilation/
contrast with upward or downward targets depends
on the initial holistic impression of similarity/dissimilarity that triggers cognitive processes, which
tend to confirm the initial impression.
C OM P ARI S ON & P E RS U AS I ON

Health Communications Based on
Persuasion Principles
Persuasion theory and research indicate that
a message needs to be personally relevant and in
some way "self-defining," so as to engage elaborative processing. At the same time, virtually all
health messages create some threat that may raise
personal concerns about response efficacy and
self-efficacy and thereby encourage counterarguing,
which may lower the effectiveness of the appeal.
Researchers have used theory-based approaches to
optimize processing but to minimize defensiveness
of health communications. Three such approaches
are described next.

Self-Affirmation
One strategy to increase receptiveness to
potentially threatening health messages involves
self-affirmation. This refers to the process whereby
people are asked to reflect on their important values
or cherished attributes, which is hypothesized to
engage a more open-minded and balanced appraisal
of threatening information (Sherman & Cohen,
2006). In laboratory research, having participants
self-affirm (e.g., describe why their most important
values are relevant to their lives) counters effects
of later performance failures or decisional regret
(Steele, 1988). According to self-affirmation theorists, self-defense involves general sense ofself-worth;
thus, affirming one aspect of the self can buffer a
threat in a different domain (Blanton, Cooper,
Skurnik, & Aronson, 1997). In the context of persuasive messages, self-affirmation should increase
central-message processing (Correll, Spencer &
Zanna, 2004), which would potentially produce
more attitude and behavior change (assuming the
influence target generates few counterarguments).
Several successful applications of self-affirmation
to health communications have been reported.
Self-affirmation increased message acceptance and
behavioral intentions and reduced denial about the
self-relevance of health messages about skin cancer and sun safety (Jessop, Simmons, & Sparks,
2009), safe sex, daily coffee consumption to prevent fibrocystic breast disease (Crocker, Niiya, &
Mischkowski, 2008), seafood consumption (Griffin
& Harris, 2011), smoking reduction (Harris, Mayle,
Mabbott, & Napper, 2007), heavy drinking (Napper,
Harris & Epton, 2009), and HIV risk (Sherman,
Nelson, & Steele, 2000). There also is evidence
that self-affirmation can undo the negative effects
of unrealistic optimism on colorectal cancer screening intentions (Klein et al., 2010). Although some

srudie involve conveniencce (college-student) samples, community residents also have been recruited
and similar benefits of self-afFil'mation obtained.
A limitation concerns a paucity of results demonsrrating an effect of self-affirmation on actual
behavior change. An exception (Epton & Harris,
2008) collected a baseline measure of fruit and
vegetable consumption and then assigned women
in rhe United Kingdom to a self-affirmation
rnanipulation (versus control: opinions on unrelated issues) prior to reading a message about the
health-promotive effects of increased consumption
of fruits and vegetables. Behavior was assessed by
having participants subsequently complete a 7 -day
diary concerning fruit and vegetable consumption.
Measures of response efficacy and self-efficacy were
also collected. Results showed that self-affirmed
participants consumed 5.5 portion more than the
conrrol group (i.e., more than one day's worth of
fruits and vegetables). Although self-affirmation was
associated with increases in response efficacy (i.e.,
eating more fruits and vegetables will improve my
health) and self-efficacy (i.e., "I can eat at least 5
portions each day"), only changes in response efficacy mediated the improvements in consumption.
These results indicate that self-affirmation has
che potential to enhance persuasive appeals. There
is a need, however, to extend the range of health
behaviors tested and to clarify whether and how
self-efficacy can contribute to health-behavior
change.

Gain and Loss Framing
According to prospect theory from decisionscience (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), whether
a health message is framed in terms of gains or
losses has consequences for changing attitudes and
behavior (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). For example, Mano, Sherman, and Updegraff (2004) used
the following gain-framed message: "Flossing your
teeth daily removes particles of food in the mouth,
avoiding bacteria, which promotes great breath."
The loss frame was, "If you do not floss your teeth
daily, particles of food remain in the mouth, collecting ba.cteria, which causes bad breath." According
to decision science, people tend to be risk averse
when a behavior involves a potential loss, but risk
preferring when a behavior involves a potential
gain. A behavior is considered to be a risky or safe
course of action depending on the extent to which
people perceive the behavior will lead to unpleasant consequences. Choosing to perform a detection
behavior, such as a colonoscopy, can be perceived as

risky because test results carry a risk of getting bad
news. On the other hand, choosing to take preventive action (e.g., flossing) has little risk and affords a
future of dental health.
Extending this reasoning, Rothman and Salovey
(1997) predicted that gain-framed health communications are more effective for instigating
illness-prevention behaviors, whereas loss-framed
messages are more effective for detection behaviors.
A large literature has tested these hypotheses in community and convenience samples (see Meyerowitz
& Chaiken, 1987; Rothman, Wlaschin, Bartels,
Latimer, & Salovey, 2008; Schneider et al., 2001).
A recent meta-analysis (Gallagher & Updegraff,
2012) of 94 experiments found gain-framed messages were more likely to encourage prevention
behaviors (r = .08), especially with regard to smoking cessation, physical activity, and skin cancer
prevention-consistent with the prediction about
prevention behavior. Loss- versus gain-framed messages, however, had similar effects on detection
behaviors, which is not supportive of the companion hypothesis. Oddly, there also were no effects on
attitudes or intentions for either kind of frame.
The weak and null findings may be because some
health issues engender different degrees of involvement across individuals. For example, cancer risks
of sun exposure should be more important for people who work outside than for those who work in an
office all day. For the latter persons, their low level
of involvement should not elicit feelings of personal
relevance, and, therefore, produce little message
elaboration. Indeed, experiments manipulating high
versus low issue involvement find stronger evidence
for predictions about the effects of gain versus loss
messages on detection versus prevention when high
involvement is created (Detweiler, Bedell, Salovey,
Pronin, & Rothman, 1999; Banks et al., 1995).
Another factor concerns how people construe
health behaviors as potentially yielding a pleasant
or an unpleasant outcome (Rothman et al., 2008).
In the case of most medical screening procedures,
the prospect of potentially bad news looms large,
so loss-framed messages have the persuasive advantage. Th::it, however, need not be the case. Users of
university health services were more persuaded by
a gain-framed message recommending a test for an
enzyme described as detecting a health benefit, bur
users were more persuaded by a loss-framed message
when the enzyme was described as a health problem (Bartels, Kelly, & Rothman, 2010). In sum,
health communicators need to be attentive to levels
of issue involvement and to how people construe
SULS, BRUCHMANN
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health behaviors to elicit the distinctive effects of
gain- and loss-framed messages.
A third factor related to the effects of gain- and
loss-frame messages concerns the degree to which
the individuals are dispositionally oriented toward
approach motivation, which is analogous to promotion, versus oriented toward avoidance motivation,
which is analogous to prevention (Higgins, 1999;
Elliot & Thrash, 2002). For instance, people may
increase their physical exercise either because they
want to improve their health (representing approach
orientation), or to avoid becoming overweight (representing avoidance orientation). As in previous
sections, the self-concept is relevant because these
different motivations reflect the "desired self" versus
the "feared self." This leads to a matching hypothesis, that persuasion and behavior change should be
maximal when the person's motivational orientation
matches the message frame.
Consistent with the matching hypothesis, persons with dispositional approach motivations were
more persuaded by a gain-framed communication
about dental flossing or physical exercise, whereas
those with avoidance motivations were more persuaded by loss-frame communication (Mann et al.,
2004; Latimer, et al., 2008).
This research also has cultural implications for the
effectiveness of health communications in an increasingly diverse society. Individualistic cultures, such as
the United States and most European countries, are
said to emphasize promotion and sensitivity to positive outcomes; whereas collectivistic cultures, such
as Asian countries, emphasize prevention and sensitivity to negative outcomes (Lee, Aaker & Gardner,
2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This translates
to predicting that communicating potential gains or
benefits of a health behavior should be more effective for persons in individualistic societies. However,
a loss frame should work better in collectivistic cultures at encouraging behavior changes. These predictions have received support in the areas of dental
hygiene (Uskul, Sherman & Fitzgibbon, 2009) and
caffeine consumption (Uskul & Oyserman, 2010).

Fear Appeals and Graphic
Wttniing Labels
Due to the concerns about eliciting denial or
defensiveness found in research, public health officials in the United States have tended not to utilize
graphic depictions of the effects of illness or risk
behaviors to the degree that was popular in earlier
decades. There is one area of public health, however,
where graphic images have been advocated-on
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cigarette-pack warning labels. Since 1960, the
federal government has instituted warning labels,
including statements, such as: "Caution: Cigarette
Smoking May be Hazardous to Your Health," or
"Surgeon General's Warning: Smoking Causes
Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, and May
Complicate Pregnancy." In Canada, Australia, and
some European countries, however, recent government regulations require larger and more specific
warnings (e.g., "Cigarettes cause lung cancer. 85%
of lung cancers are caused by smoking and 80% of
lung cancer victims die within three years."), accompanied by images, such as a picrure of a human lung
detailing cancerous growths. Lobbying by health
organizations encouraged the passage of the U.S .
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act of 2009, which requires color graphics with
supplemental text that depicts the negative consequences of smoking to cover 50% of the front and
rear of each pack. Currently, this directive is being
challenged in the courts with tobacco companies
claiming the new regulations infringe on their right
to free speech.
There is much evidence favoring the use of
graphic warning levels (e.g., Borland, & Hill,
1997) and results continue to be released from the
International Tobacco Control Four Country Survey
Study conducted since 2002 (Canada, Australia,
United Kingdom and United States) to evaluate
the effects. Most of the available evidence indicates
that exposure to graphic labels leads to enhanced
knowledge about smoking risks and increased interest in quitting (e.g., Li , Borland, Yong et al., 2012).
A panel study conducted in Canada demonstrated
that smokers who had read, thought about, and discussed the new labels at baseline were more likely
to have quit, made a quit attempt, or reduced their
smoking three months later (Hammond, Fong,
McDonald, Cameron, & Brown, 2003).
These results seem to contradict the earlier
research suggesting that high fear is ineffective unless
people also perceive they have resource options and
self-efficacy. However, graphic warning labels have
an advantage that billboards and media messages
do not-smokers invariably see the gory imagery
every time they take a cigarette out of its pack. Also,
the public health community in Canada may have
promored cessation aids so widely, in combi.narion
with the graphic labels that people a.re succes ful at
quitting. Alternatively: perhaps smokers who intend
ro quir are likely to pay arrenrion co the .labels,
although the prospective associations do not favor
this explanation (Hammond et al., 2003).

For the purpose of balance, quitting and quitting

permanent& are quite different; relapse in 3-6 months
is common, so the long-term benefits of graphic
warnings await further confirmation. Nonetheless,
research on self-quitters shows that after two or three
attempts, many smokers acquire sufficient knowledge and skills to give up the habit permanently
(Schachter, 1982, cf. Cohen et al., 1989). Another
reservation is that some people tend to question the
authenticity of the imagery in warnings and assume
the images have deliberately been distorted, which is
suggestive of denial or defensiveness described earlier
(McCool, Webb, Cameron, & Hoek, 2012).
1hese concerns lead us to conclude that graphic
warning labels should be most effective if they also
provided information about how to contact a telephone quit line that offers concrete strategies and
assistance in quitting and resisting relapse. In this
way, threat can be handled by providing reassurance
about response options and personal self-efficacy.
Fear and Framing. Some researchers (Cameron &
Chan, 2008) have advanced the idea that fear arousal
should enhance the impact of loss-framed messages
but detract from gain-framed messages. The prediction about fear and loss framing has been tested
and confirmed by Gerend and Maner (2011). 1hese
researchers proposed that people should be more
motivated to adhere to behavior change recommendations if they receive a message consistent with their
current motivational state. Consequently, inducing
fear, with its concomitant focus on risk and threat,
should produce more responsiveness to a loss-framed
message. In their study, undergraduates completed a
baseline assessment of fruit and vegetable imake followed by an emotion-induction task. Then they read
a gain- or loss-framed pamphlet promoting more
fruits and vegetable and provided tips about how to
implement the recommendations. Then, two-weeks
later, participants completed another assessment of
fruit and vegetable consumption. Those who had
received a fear induction showed more adherence
to the recommendations communicated with a loss
frame. Interestingly, inducing a different type of
negative emotion, anger, did not have this effect (see
Gerend & Maner, 2011 ).

Empirical Evidence on Health
Communication Based on Social
Comparison
Social-Norm Campaigns
There have been several ways that the power of
social comparisons has been harnessed by health
communications to recalibrate norms and standards

related to health and motivated behavior change.
One method capitalizes on how comparisons concerning relative standing with peers provide information about appropriate beliefs and practices.
Surveys and interviews with community-residing
adults demonstrate that people worry and act on
their level of personal risk when they believe or are
informed they are at higher risk than their peers
(Dillard, McCaul, Kelso, & Klein, 2006; Lipkus &
Klein, 2006). In one such study (Lipkus & Klein,
2006), community residents were recruited and
stratified to high- and low-risk groups for colorectal cancer, based on the presence or absence of
actual risk factors. They also were informed that
they had more than the average number of risk factors of a group of 100 other people also tested or
they received no risk information. Those informed
they were higher in comparative risk had the highest intentions and were more likely to undergo
colorectal screening. Of note, recent websites that
are designed to provide people with information
about their disease risk in order to promote behavior change (e.g., Your Disease Risk website (http://
www.yourdiseaserisk.wustl.edu/) have chosen to
provide feedback in a comparative framework.
Besides campaigns that communicate health risks,
it has become a common practice to provide social
norms about health behavior practices, such as alcohol consumption and smoking (Perkins, 2002). The
premise is chat the public often overestimates the
prevalence of unhealthful practices, such as problem eating or problem drinking, because just a few
extreme episodes are so memorable and thereby
distort the perceived norm about how most people
behave (Suls & Green, 2003; Bourgeosie & Bowen,
2001). Campaigns providing actual behavioral norms
to correct norm estimates to discourage unhealthy
practices (e.g., Agostinelli, Brown, & Miller, 1995)
have had some success. However, the extent to which
wide-scale dissemination of norms can successfully
inculcate healthier practices is unknown. Whereas
bingers might reduce their drinking to behave more
like the "average," people who are temperate, upon
learning the "norm," may shift to become less temperate (Hansen & Graham, 1991; Schultz, Nolan,
Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). In other
words, providing norms in community campaigns
might actually backfire for some persons.

Health Communications Using
Comparison with Patients
In medical settings, it is not uncommon
for patients with acute or chronic illness to be
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exposed to health communications that involve
social comparisons. Prior or following surgery,
patients may be asked to view videotapes depicting the procedure and its sequelae and what practices should be followed postdischarge. Often,
these videotapes feature real patients or actors
posing as patients who d escribe their experiences.
More informal health communications may be
transmi teed in patient support groups where
some comparisons may be implicit and explicit.
Theory and laboratory research described earlier
has been applied to coping in acute and chronic
illness patients.
Whether comparisons are associated with better
or worse responses depends, in part, on how patients
construe their likelihood of improvement or decline
(Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; see also Mussweiler,
2003). If people perceive they can improve, they
cognitively search for similarities with a patient who
is better off, leading to upward assimilation . If they
do not believe they are capable of improvement,
they search for differences with the fortunate target, leading to downward contrast. If people think
they may become worse, then they will search for
similarities with a less fortunate patient, resulting in
downward assimilation. Finally, if they think they
can get better, then they should search for differences with the less fortunate, producing upward
contrast. Experimental studies tend to support
these predictions with one exception: Downward
assimilation is rarely seen (Wheeler & Suls, 2007) ,
probably because most people are highly motivated
to avoid thinking about the prospect of getting
worse so motivation trumps belief about a possible
decline .
Some people, however, may be temperamentally
inclined to be optimistic or pessimistic. Cancer
patients who score high in neuroticism respond
unfavorably to learning about both more and less
fortunate patients (Van der Zee, Oldersma, Buunk,
& Bos, 1998). Because neurotics tend to have a negative outlook, including low expectations about the
future, their poorer responses to any kind of comparison is understandable .
An illustrative study found most patients
try to make the best of comparisons (Stanton,
Danoff-Burg, Cameron , Snider, & Kirk, 1999).
Breast cancer patients listened to an interview with
a (supposed) patient whose comments reflected
good, poor, or unspecified psychological and physical status. Listening to the poorly adjusted patient
led to higher self-ratings of adjustment than listening to a well-adjusted patient, although even the
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latter group rated adjustment and prognosis as better than char described by the patient in the interview. There were apparent benefits from exposure
to better off or worse off patients, but assimilation
with a less fortunate patient was resisted.
A recent, comprehensive review (Arigo, Suls &
Smyth, 2012) found that exposure to better-off
patients produces more favorable outcomes than to
worse-off patients. However, rarely does a better-o ff
patient produce significantly better moods or
self-efficacy than exposure to a neutral control
condition. We think the reaso n is connected to
considerations described earlier about basic comparison processes: Assimilation to someone of
higher standing (or lower standing) requires an initial impression of similarity to facilitate more elaborate search for additional similarities (Mussweiler,
2003). Typically, in past studies exposing patients
to high-functioning comparison vignettes, there has
been no attempt to highlight similarities beyond
gender and age. To encourage patients to find more
similarity with the target, it probably is essential to
optimally match the patient's attributes and preferences with the target. Following the logic of the
proxy theory and selective-accessibility theory, comparison models should be tailored co the patient's
attributes to optimize the opportunity for upward
assimilation.
One implication is that, as audiovisual recordings of patient models in psycho-educational interventions increasingly are being used to prepare
patients for medical procedures (Mahler & Kulik,
1998), they need to be developed with careful attention to factors identified in experimental research,
such as similarities to the target and perceived
attainment. At the same time, basic research showing that highly neurotic patients may compare
indiscriminately indicates such persons may need
special interventions to counteract their generally
negative expectations.
Support Groups. Health information also is
communicated in Internet chat-rooms and patient
support groups-settings in which social comparisons play an important role (Carmack-Taylor
et al., 2007; Bunde et al., 2006) . In conventional
support groups, patients with a particular disease are recruited, so groups are heterogeneous in
terms of distress level and disease severity. The segment of well-adjusted patients may have no need
for support, but may be included to serve as role
models and targets of positive assimilation, consistent with the theory and lab studies described
earlier.

Combining Persuasion

and Comparison in Health
Communications
TailoredMessages
Although the role of comparison processes is
not always explicitly acknowledged, personalized
cailored health communications, a relatively recent
development, engage both persuasion and comparis·o n processes. In the majority of past programs
involving health communicarions, the materials
consist of a " ... single, generalized body of information in the form of brochures, booklets or pamphlets designed for the general population or for
some demographic subgroup," (Kreuter, Streoher,
& Glassman, 1999, p. 276). With the introduction
of new computer technologies, persuasive messages
can be quickly tailored to a target's attributes, needs,
and interests. The latter personal information may,
in some cases, be available in medical records, but
a person's status can be self-administered, assessed
by interview or administered by an interactive computer program. For example, to create a personalized tailored appeal for diet change, informatio n is
collected about age, gender, current diet, cooking
skills and eating patterns (Kreuter, Bull, C lark, &
Oswald, 1999) . Personalized tailored materials can
capitalize on personal relevance, which, in turn,
prompts elaborative cognitive processes (Petry &
Cacioppo, 1981).
Further, such tailoring should facilitate the kind
of assimilative processing described in the proxy and
selective accessibility accounts of social comparison .
Even if the health communication presents facts and
arguments advocating change and behavioral strategies without providing a role model or testimonial
(from a real or fictitious person), the communication represents a viewpoint concerning relevant
beliefs, values, and behaviors that constitute a kind
of social comparison with an "idea" of a comparison
target. Thus, value, belief, and preference-prediction
comparison processes should be engaged, particularly when the informatio n matches the recipient's
personal attributes and current standing. The combination of assimilation promoted by elaboration
and comparison should optimize persuas ion.
Several empirical studies offer support for these
ideas (Bull, Kreuter, & Scharff, 1999; Kreuter et al.,
1999; Holt, Clark, Kreuter, & Scharff, 2000 ; Brug,
Steenhaus, Van Assema, & De Vries, 1996) . For
example, adult primary-care patients were randomly
assigned to receive personalized tailored materials
to increase their physical activity (matched to the
patients' goals, types of acrivities and perceived

barriers) or to receive unpersonalized generic materials. The group receiving th e personalized tailored
communication showed larger increases in physical
activity (Bull et al., 1999). Other evidence confirms
that such messages elicit greater interest, more positive self-assertions and more positive thoughts about
behavior change intentions (Skinner, Campbell,
Rimer, Curry, & Prochaska, 1999) than more
generic, mass-produced materials.

Narrative Communication
A second way in which comparison and persuasion processes can be engaged is in narrative h ealth
communications. The health messages described
in earlier sections of this chapter involve statistical evidence, probability and appeals to reasonsometimes referred to as expository communication.
The ELM is thought to be the appropriate model
for such messages. An alternative form is narrative communication, which employs storytelling
and testimonials, and involves a different kind of
processing (Green & Brock, 2000). Whereas ELM
emphasizes relevance or involvement with respect
to the message topic, narrative processes emphasize the degree of identification with the characters,
referred as absorp tion or tramportation (Slater &
Rauner, 2002) . This transportation, induced by a
compelling narrative, is supposed to inhibit counterarguing and increase cognitive rehearsal and
recall, thereby maximizing persuasion and behavior
change (Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007).
In one representative study (McQueen, Kreuter,
Kalesan, & Alcaraz, 2011), low-income African
American women were assigned to watch a narrative
video featuring stories from African American breast
cancer survivors or a content-equivalent informational video about mammography. Responses were
collected immediately, at 3- and 6-months. Women
who watched the narrative video reported being
more engaged, and reported more positive affect and
less counterarguing with the appeal to seek mammograms versus those women watchi ng the expository video. No evidence was reported about later
screening although the narrative message was associ::ited with behavioral correlates of screening. Two
other studies testing the effects of narrative communication have found subsequent effects on behavio r, such as blood pressure control (Houston et al. ,
2011) and safety (Ricketts, Shanteau, McSpadden,
& Fernandez-Medina, 2010).
Our perspective about narrative communications is their persuasive power is based in part on
joining persuasion and comparison processes.
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To the extent a narrative persuasive appeal is able to
prompt assimilation with the characters (potential
proxies) then their arguments, experiences, opinions, and behaviors must appear appropriate for
the audience. This means it is essential to identify
the target's attributes, which create an initial holistic impression of similarity with the characters (in
accord with SAM) and related attributes that give
the targets confidence they can successfully implement the changes and experience positive health
outcomes (in accord with the proxy model; Wheeler
etal., 1997).

High-Tailored Proxy Health
Interventions
Our final topic concerns novel interventions,
for example for smoking cessation or diet programs that also include many of the kinds of
information included in one-shot health communications (Strecher et al., 2008; see also Alexander
et al., 2010). The novel elements involve testing a
low-tailored versus a high-tailored smoker's story
about successfully quitting plus intervention components of cognitive-behavioral therapy. In our
terms, such an intervention attempts to maximize
the engagement of social comparison and persuasion processes to create behavior change.
In this multifactor study (Strecher et al.,
2008), smokers enrolled in two HMOs, who
were considering quitting, received access to a free
smoking-cessation program delivered via the web
and a free supply of nicotine replacement patches.
At the start, particip_ants completed a baseline questionnaire about smoking history, demographic,
psychosocial and health characteristics (this information was used to create the tailoring). Then,
participants were randomly assigned to conditions
that manipulated several factors in a fractional factorial design (Collins, Murphy, Nair, & Strecher,
2005). Participants assigned to the single exposure
condition received all the information during one
Internet session, whereas those assigned to multiple exposure received the same materials distributed over 5 weeks. High-depth outcome expectatiom
participants received advice and feedback related
to their specific motives reported for wanting to
quit in the baseline questionnaire; low-depth participants received feedback relating to their motives,
but the program did not make as many connections to their current health or lifestyles. Smokers
assigned to high-depth efficacy expectations received
information to cope with their (reported in the
survey) two most problematic barriers to quitting,
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whereas low-depth parnc1pants received content
about barriers that was framed in broader terms.
The success stories, including a profile of a successful quitter, also were manipulated in terms of depth.
The high-depth participants received a story about
someone of the same gender, age, ethnicity, marital status, which also included matching outcome
and efficacy expectations. In contrast, the low depth
participants only shared gender with the person in
the narrative. Participants were contacted via telephone six months postquit date and completed a
7-day assessment of smoking abstinence.
Abstinence was strongly related to receipt of a
high-depth success story. In fact, the combination
of highest tailored intervention components yielded
a mean quit rate of about 39%, which for a low-cost,
minimal contact, population-based intervention
is impressive (Lancaster & Stead, 1998). A single
exposure was as effective as multiple exposures.
Interestingly, depth of outcome or efficacy expectations presented in a conventional, advice style was
not associated with smoking cessation, whereas this
same information embedded in the success story
framework was effective. As Strecher et al. (2008)
observe, "... how you say it and who says it are at
least as important as what you say" (p. 380).
The present authors, however, would take this further. The "how," "who," and "what" in this creative
and efficacious intervention produced meaningful
behavior change because a proxy was presented who
shared personal characteristics, opinions, experiences,
. and related attributes in connection with smoking
and who modeled successful health behavior change.
The similarities in personal characteristics should
have facilitated identification/assimilation and the
matching of related attributes should have made the
role model's success seem like an appropriate and
approachable goal for oneself (Wheeler & Suls, 2005).
Concurrently, the content and arguments conveyed
through a story should have reduced counterarguing (based on narrative theory). This approach has
considerable potential. Future study and implementation is needed to test the reach and effectiveness of
such combined health communication-intervention
efforts using the Internet as a platform.

Conclusions
Since the early 1950s, health communications
have been systematically tested and implemented
using several different modalities. This chapter
presented a selective review of those aspects of
health-communication campaigns that capital·
ize on social comparison and persuasion processes

clucidaced by basic researd1. For both rypcs of
rocesses, engagement of the core elemencs of che
~elf-sysrem eerns esscncial ro understand copi ng,
opinion, belief, and behavior. Persua ion theories
emphasize che ro le of personal relevance and the elf
in acrive cognicivc processing of persuasive appeals
LO produce meaningful behavior change. Wirh chat
recogni rion, persuasion theory has inspired research
on rhe effects of self-affirmatio n, fram ing, and fear.
Compari on theory has motivated the developlJlent of programs to correct perceptions of social
norms, identified how people use comparison to
cv~luare their relative standing, to assess what they
can accomplish, to manage threat, and to utilize
information about better- and worse-off persons
or groups. Experr in health communications al o
have incorporaced the findings and insights of
this research with audiovisual materials, and social
·upport group des igned for Internet use. Fi nally,
the newest generation of health communication
involves an integration of advances in persua$ion
(e.g., narrative theory), comparison (e.g., matching of personal attributes to facilitate assimilation)
and clinical intervention practices, such as cognitive
behavior therapy to achieve health benefits.
If the past is any indication, as persuasion and
comparison theory/research continues to extend and
refine its insights and strategies, health communication researchers and practitioners will import them
to advance the public health. What is learned from
implementation in the field will provide feedback
and, no doubt, present surprising findings, as input
for basic researchers (Suls, Luger, & Martin, 2010;
Cialclini, 1980). So the scientific cycle will continue
from "bench to bedside" and from "bedside (and
community) to bench"-a dynamic, recursive loop.

References
Agostinelli, G., Brown, J. M., & Miller, W. R. (1995). Effects of
normative feedback on consumption among heavy drinking
college students. journal ofDrug Education, 25, 31-40.
Ajzen, I. (2001). Nature and operation of attitudes. Annual
Review ofPsychology, 52, 27-58.
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (2005). The influence of attitudes on
behavior. In D. Albarracin, B.T. Johnson, & M.P. Zanna,
(Eds.), (2005). 7he handbook of attitudr.s (pp. 173-221).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Alexander, G. L., McClure, J. B., Calvi, J. H., Divine, G. W.,
Stopponi, M.A., Rolnick, S. J., ... &Johnson, C. C. (2010).
A randomized clinical trial evaluating online interventions to
improve fruit and vegetable consumption. Americ(tn journal
ofPublic Health, 100, 319-326.
Armitage, C. J., & Conner, M. (2001). Efficacy of the theory of
planned behavior: A meta-analysis. British Journal of Social
Psychology, 40, 471-499.

Arigo, D., Suls, J., & Smyth, J. M. (2012). Social comparisons
and chronic illness: Research ynrhesis and clin ical implications. Health Psychology Review, 1-61.
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action:
A social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Banks, S. M., Salovey, P., Greener, 5., Rothman, A. J., Moyer,
A., & Beauvais, J. (1995). The effects of message framing on
mammography utilization. Health Psychology, 14, 178-184.
Bartels, R. D., Kelly, K. M., & Rothman, A. J. (2010). Moving
beyond the function of the health behavior: The cff~cc of
message frame on behavioural decision-making. Psy,·hology
& Health, 25, 821-838.
Blanton, H., Cooper, J. , Skurnik, I., & Aronson, J. (1997).
When bad thin~ happen co good fecdb~ck: Exaccrb~ting the
need for self-justification with self-affirmation . Pmontdlty &
Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 684-692.
Borland, R., & Hill, D. (1997). Initial impact of the new
Australian tobacco health warnings on knowledge. Tobacco
Control, 6, 317-325.
Bourgeosie, M., & Bowen, A. (2001). Self-org:mizatlon of
alcohol-related atcirudcs and beliefs in a campus housing
complex: An initial investigation. Health Psychology, 20,
434-437.
Brock, T. (1965). Communicator-recipient similarity and decision change . journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 1,
650-654.
Brown, J. D., Novick, N. J., Lord, K. A. & Richards, J. M.
(I 992). When Gulliver travels: Social context, psychological
closeness, and self-appraisals. Journal of Personality & Social
Psychology, 62, 717-727.
Brug, J., Sceenhaus, I., Van Assema, P., & De Vries, H. (1996) .
The impact of a computer-tailored nutrition intervention.
Preventive Medicine, 25, 236-242.
Bull, F. C., Kreuter, M. W., & Scharff, D. P. (1999). Effects
of tailored, personalized, and general materials on physical
activity. Patient Education & Counseling, 36, 181-192.
Bunde, M., Suls J., Manin, R., & Barnett, K. (2006).
Hystcriistcrs on line: . ocinl support and social comparison
among hysccrcccomy patients on the l n ccrncr. Aimals of
Behavioral Medicine, 31, 271-278.
Buunk, B. P., Collins, R. L., Taylor, 5. E., VanYperen, N. W., &
Dakof, G . A. (1990). The affective consequences of social
comparison: Eicher direcrlon has its ups :md downs. journal
ofl'mon11/ity &Socifll PJJ·c/J(J/ugy, 59 (6), L238- l249,
Cacioppo, J. T., & Pecty, R. E. ( L982). ·The need for cognition.
jo11rruil ofJ>mo1111/h:y &Socilll Ps;•chology, 42, 116-l31.
Cacioppo, J. T., Pcrty, 11. E., & Morris, K. j . ( 1983). !!ffccrs of
need for cognition on mcss:ige cvnluacion, rcc:ill, and persuasion. Journal ofPersonality & Social Psychology, 45, 805-818.
Cameron, L. D. & Chan, C.K.Y. (2008). Designing health communications: Harnessing the power of affect, imagery, and
self-regulation. Social & Personality Psychology Compass, 2,
262-282.
Carmack-Taylor, C. L., Kulik, J., Badr, H., Smith, M .,
Bascn-EngquL c, K., Pcncdo, f., & Grit7~ E. R. (2007). A
social comp:irison theory analysis of group composi tion and
cfficncy of cancer supporc groups. Social Scienu & Medicine,
65, 262-273.
Cialdini, R. B. (1980). Full-cycle social psychology. In L.
Bickman (Ed.), Applied social psychology annual (Vol. 1,
pp. 21-47). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Cohen, S., Lichtenstein, E., Prochaska. J., Rossi, P., Gritz, E.,
Carr,½· R., .. . & Ossip-Klein, D. (1989) . Debunking myths

SULS, BRUCHMANN

263

about self-quitting: Evidence from ten prospective studies of persons who attempt to quit smoking by themselves.
American Psychologist, 44, 1355-1365.
Collins, L. M., Murphy, S. A., Nair, V., & Screcher, V. (2005).
A strategy for opt imizing and evaluating behavioral interventions. Annals ofBehavioral Medicine, 30, 65-73.
Collins, R. L. (1996) For better or for worse: The impact of
upward social comparisons on self-evaluations. Psychological
Bulletin, 119, 51- 69.
Correll, J., Spencer, S. J., & Zanna, M. P. (2004). An affirmed
self and an open mind: Self-affirmation and sensitivity to
argument strength. Journal ofExperimental Social Psychology,
40, 350-356.
Crocker, J., Niiya, Y., & Mischkowski, D. (2008). Why does
writing about important values reduce defensiveness?
Self-affirmation and the role of positive, other-directed feelings . Psychological Science, 19, 740-747.
Detweiler, J. B., Bedell, B. T., Salovey, P., Pronin, E., &
Rothman, A. J. (1999). Message framing and sunscreen
use: Gain-framed messages motivate beach-goers. Health
Psychology, 18, 189-196.
Dillard, A. J., McCaul, K., Kelso, P. D., & Klein, W. M. P.
(2006). Resisting good news: Reactions to breast cancer risk
information. Health Communication, 19, 115-123.
Elliot, A. J. & Thrash, T. M . (2002). Approach-avoidance motivation in personality: Approach and avoidance temperaments and goals. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology,
82, 804-818.
Epton, T., & Harris, P. (2008). Self-affirmation promotes health
behavior change. Health Psychology, 74, 746-752.
Festinger, L. (1954a). A theory of social comparison processes.
Human Relations, 7, 117-140.
Festinger, L. (19546). Motivation leading ro social behavior. In
M. R. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation (pp.
191-218). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
Fisher, J. D., & Fisher, W. A. (1992). Changing AIDS-risk
behavior. Psychological Bulletin, 111, 455--474.
Gallagher, K. M. & Updegraff, J. A. (2012). Health message framing effects on attitudes, intentions and behavior:
A meta-analytic review. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 43,
101-116.
Gerend, M., & Maner, J. (2011). Fear, anger, fruits, and veggies: Interactive effects of emotion and message framing on
health behavior. Health Psychology, 30, 420--423.
Giner-Sorolla, R. (1999). Affect in attitude: Immediate and
deliberative perspectives. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope, (Ed.),
Dual-process theories in social psychology (pp. 441--461).
New York: Guilford Press.
Goethals, G. R., & Darley, J.M. (1977), Social comparison theory: An attributional approach. In J. Suls & R. Miller (Eds.),

Social comparison processes: Theoretical and empirical perspectives (pp. 259- 278). Washington, DC: Hemisphere.
Green, M. C., & Brock, T. C. (2000). The role of transportation in the persuasiveness of public narratives . Journal of
Personality &Social Psychology, 79, 701-721.
Griffin, D. W. & H arris, P.R. (2011). Calibrating the response to
health warnings: Limit ing both overreaction and underreaction with self-affirmation. Psychological Science, 22, 572-578.
Hammond, D., Fong, G. T., McDonald, P. W., Cameron, R., &
Brown, K. S. (2003). Impact of graphic Canadian warning
labels on adult smoking behavior. Tobacco Control, 12, 391-395.
Hansen, W. & Graham, J. (1991). Preventing alcohol, marijuana and cigarette use among adolescences: Peer resistance

COMPARISON & PERSUASION

tr.li ning versus establishing conservative norms. Preven .
!:foe
Mttlicine, 20, 4 l4--430.
Harris, P., Mnylc, K., Mabborr, M,', ~ N_apper, L. (200 ).
7
Sclf-aflirmmion reduce.~ smokers dcfcns1vcncss co graphic
o n- pack cig;uwe warning labels. He11/rh Ptjd1ology, 26,
434-446.
Hassan, L.M., Shiu, E., Thrasher, J. F., Fong, G. '[, & 1-L,srings
. (2008) . E.xplori ng ,he dfoctivcn ss of cigarette W;trn:
ing lnbds: Fi ndings ft-om the United med nnd Unitcc:1
Kingdom Arms of the lmcrnacional Tob:lcco Co nuol (rrq
Four Country Survey. lm1m111tio1111l }011rnnl of Nonprofu &
Voluntary Sector Marketing, 13, 263-274.
Higgins, E.T. (1999). Promotion and prevention as a motiva.
tional duality: Implications for evaluative processes. In S,
Ch:i.ikcn & Y. Trope, (Eds}, Dual-process theories in socialpsychology (pp. 503-525). New York: Guilford Press.
Hinyard, L. J., & Kreuter, M. W. (2007). Using narrative communication as a tool for health behavior change: A conceptual, theoretical and empirical overview. Health Education 6
Behavior, 34, 777-792.
Holt, C. L., Clark, E. M., Kreuter, M. W., & Scharff, D. P,
(2000), Does locus of control moderate the effects of tailored
health education materials? Health Education Research, 15,
393-403.
Houston, T. K., Allison, J. J., Sussman, M., Horn, W., Holt,
C. L., Trobaugh, J., ... & Hullett, S. (2011). Culturally
appropriate storytelling to improve blood pressure. Annals of
lnternalMedicine, 154, 77- 84.
Hovland, C. I., Janis, I. L., & Kelley, H. H. (1953).

Communication and persuasion: Psychological studies of opinion change. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Ito, T., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2001). Affect and attitudes: A social
neuroscience approach. In J. P. Forgas, (Ed.), Handbook of
affect and social cognition, (pp. 50-74) . Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Janis, I., (1967). Effects offear arousal on attitude change: Recent
developments in theory and experimental research. Advances
in Experimental Psychology, 4, 166-224.
Jessop, D., Simmons, L., & Sparks, P. (2009). Motivation
and behavioral consequences of self-affirmation: A study
of sunscreen use among women. Psychology & Health, 24,
529-544.
Johnson, B. T., & Eagly, A. H . (1989). Effects of involvement
on persuasion: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 106,
290-314.
Klein, W. M. P. (1997). Objective standards are not
enough: Affective, self-evaluative and behavioral responses
to social comparison information. journal of Personality &
Social Psychology, 72, 763-774.
Klein, W. M. P., Lipkus, I. M ., Scholl, S. M., McQueen, A.,
Cerully, J. L., & Harris, P.R. (2010). Self-affirmation moderates effects of unrealistic optimism and pessimism on
reactions to tailored risk feedback. Psychology & Health, 25,
1195-1208.
Kreuter, M. W., Bull, F. C., Clark, E. M., & Oswald, D. L.
(1999). Understanding how people process health information: A comparison of tailored and untailored weight loss
materials. Health Psychology, 18, 487--494.
Kreuter, M. W., Strecher, V., & Glassman, B. (1999). One size
does not fie all: The case for tailoring print materials. Annals
ofBehavioral Medicine, 21, 276-283.
Lancaster, T., & Stead, L.F. (1998). Self-help interventions for
smoking cessation. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews.
4, Art. No: CDOO 1118.

1,acirner, A. E., Rench, T. A., Rivers, S. E., Katulak, N.A.,
M3terese, S.A., Cadmus L, .. .& Salovey, P. et al. (2008).
Promoting participation in physical activity using framed
rnessages: An application of prospect theory. British journal
of Fle11l1h Psyd,olagy, 13, 659-68 L.
Lee, A. Y., Aaker, J. L., & Gnrdner, W. K (2000). 'TI1e pleasures
and pnins of disrinct self-construnls: The role of intcc·dcpcndcnce In regulatory focu~. }01mw/ of f>mo11ality & Social
P,ychology, 78, I [22- 11 34.
Levend1nl, H. (1970). Finding and theory in the tudy of
fear-arousing communicacions. Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology, 5, 119-186.
uventhal, H., Singe1·, R., nnd Jones, S. (1965). Effects of fear
and specificity of recommendacion upon attitudes and
behavior. journal ofPersonality & Social Psychology, 2, 20-29.
Li, L., Borland, R., Yong, H-H, Hitchman, S. C., Walcefield,
M.A., Kasza, K. A. & Fong, G. T. (2012). The association
between exposure to point-of-sale anti-smoking warnings
and smokers' interest in quitting and quit attempts: Findings
from the International Tobacco Control Four Country
Survey. Addiction, 107, 425--433.
Lipkus, I., & Klein, \VI, M. (2006). Effects of commun icncing
social comparison information on risk perceptions for colorcctal cancer.journal ofHealth Communication, 11, 391--407.
Lockwood, P. & Kunda, Z. (1997). Superstars and me: Predicting
the impact of role models on the self. Journal ofPersonality &
Social Psychology, 73, 91-103.
Mahler, H. & Kulik, J.A. (1998). Effects of preparatory videompcs on sdf-cllicacy bclicli; ancl recovery from coronary
bypass surgery, /lmuils ofBehaviort1L /';/edi.-iue, 20, 39--46.
Maddux, J. E., & Rogers, R. W. (1983). Protection motivation
and self-efficacy: A revised theory of fear appeals and attitude change. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19,
469--479.
Mann, T., Sherman, D., & Updegraff, J. (2004). Dispositional
motivations and message framing: A test of the congruency
hypothesis in coJlege srudcncs. Healrh A-ycho/,ogy, 23, 330-334.
Mnrkus, H. R. & Kirayama, S. (1991). Culture and the
self: Implications for cognition, emotion and motivation.
Psychologhwt Review, 98, 224-253.
McCool, J., Webb, L., Cameron, L. D., & Hoek, J. (2012) .
Graphic warning labels on plain cigarette packs: Will chey
make a difference to adolescents? Soci11/ Scie11ce d· Medicine,
74, 1269-1273.
McGuire, W. J. (1968). The nature of attitudes and attitude
change. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of
sucittl psJchology {2nd ed., Vol. 3, pp. 136-314). Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley.
McQueen, A., Kreuter, M.W:, Kalesan, B., & Alcaraz, K. I.
(2011). Understanding narrative effects: The impact of breast
cancer survivor stories on message processing, attitudes and
beliefs among African American women. Health Psychology,
30, 674-682.
Meytruwitz, B. E., & Chaiken, S. (1987). The effect of message framing on breast self-examination attitudes, intentions,
and behavior. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 52,
500-510.
Morse, S., & Gergen, K. J. (1970). Social comparison,
self-consistency, and the concept of the self. ]011rnal of
Personality & Social Psychology, 16, 148-156.
Mussweiler, T. (2003). Comparison processes in social judgment: Mechanisms and consequences. Psychological Review,
110, 472---489.

Napper, L., Harris, P.R., & Epton, T. (2009). Developiag and
testing a self-affirmation manipulntion. Self & Tdmtlty,
8, 45-62.
'
Perkins, H. W: (2002). Social norms and the prevention of alcohol misuse in collegiate contexts. journal ofStudies in Alcohol,
14, 164-172.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1979). Issue-involvement crut
increase or decrease persunsion by enhancing messagc-rcleva.nr
cognitive responses. Journal ofPersonality & Social Psychology,
37, 1915-1926.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1981). A11i1u,l,1 and permtt•
sion: Classic and comemporary ttppruaches. Dubuque, IA: Wm.
C. Brown.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J.T. (l984).1J,c effects of involvement
on responses to argument quamicy and qu~liry: Ccnrrnl nnd
pcriphernl romcs to persuasion. ju11mal o/ Pmo,utlit:y c,'Social Psycholog)', 46, 69-81.
Petty, R. E.. & C1cioppo, J. T. (1986). 'TI1c Elnbomclon Likelihood Model C>f pc~un,<ion. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Aduances
in experimental social psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 123-205).
New York: Academic Press.
Petey; R. £., C1cioppo. J. T., & Goldm.n, R. ( 1981). Personal
involvemcnc ~ :t determinant of argument-b,i~cd persuasion.
Journal ofPersonality & Social Psychology, 4 I, 847-85 5.
Percy, R. E., morn T. M., & Brock, TC. (Eds.), (1981).
Cognitive mpo11ses in pcm111sio11. H illsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Rickcu:s, M., Shantcau, J ., McSpadclcn, B & Pcrnundc1rMedina,
K.M. (2010). Using stories to battle unintentional injuries: Narratives in safety and health communication. Social
Science & Medicine, 70, 1441-1449.
Rogers, R. W. (1975). A protcccion motivarion theory of fear
appeals and atritude change. ]our//ld of PsyclH1l11gy, 91,
93-114.
Rothman, A. J., & Salovey, P. (1997). Shaping perceptions to
motivate healthy behavior: The role of message framing.
Psychological Butletin, 121, 3-19.
Rothman, A. J., Wlaschin, J. T., Bartels, R. D., Latimer, A. &
Salovey, P. (2008). How persons and situations regulate message framing effects: The study of health behavior. In A.J.
Elliot (Ed), Handbook of approach and avoidance motivation
(pp. 475--486). New York: Psychology Press.
Rothman, A. J., & Salovey, f>. (2007). The reciprocal relation
between principles and practice: Social psychology and
health behavior. In A. W. Kruglanski & E.T. Higgins (Eds.),
Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (2nd ed.,
pp. 826-849). New York: Guilford Press.
Ruiter, R. A., Kok, G., Verplanken, B., & Brug, J. (2001).
Evoked fear and effects of appeals on attitudes to performing
breast self-examination: An information processing perspective. Health Education Research, 16, 307-319.
Schachter, S. (1982). Recidivism and self-cure of smoking and
obesicy. American Psychologist, 37, 436--444.
Schneider, T. R., Salovey, P., Apanovitch, A M., Pizarro, J.,
McCarthy, 0., Zullo, J,, & Rothman, A.J. (2001). The effects
of message fram ing and ethnic targeting on mammography US'~
among low-inco111c W(}lllCII. 1-Jcnlrh Psychology, 20, 256--266.
Schult., P., Nolan,J., ialdini, R., Gold tcin, N., & Griskcvicius,
V. (2007). The constructive, destructive and reconstructive
powct of social norms. Psychological Scimce, 18, 429--434.
Seiter,, R.H., & Gass,, J.S. (2010). Persuasion, social influence,
a11d L'Omp/im1ce gaining (5th ed.). New York: Allyn & Bacon.
Sheeran, P. (2002). Intention-behaviour relations: A conceptual
and empirical review, In W: Strocbe & M. Hewstone (Eds.),

SULS, BRUCHMANN

265

European review of social psychology, (Vol. 12, pp. 1-36),
London: Wiley.
Sherman, D., & Cohen, G. (2006). The psychology of
self-defense: Self-affirmation theory. Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology, 38, 183-242.
Sherman, D., Nelson, L. D., & Steele, C. M. {2000). Do messages about health risks threaten the self:' Increasing the acceptance of threatening health messages via self-affirmation,
Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1046-1058.
Skinner, C. S., Campbell, M. K., Rimer, B. K., Curry, S,, &
Prochaska, J, 0. (1999). How effective is tailored print communication. Annals ofBehavioral Medicine, 21, 290-298.
Slater, M. D., & Rouner, D. (2002), Entertainment-education
and elaboration-likelihood: Understanding the processing of
narrative persuasion. Communication Theory, 12, 173-191.
Stanton, A. L., Danoff-Burg, S., Cameron, L., Snider, P. R., &
Kirk, S. B. (1999). Social comparison and adjustment to breast
cancer: An experimental examination of upward affiliation and
downward evaluation. Health Psychology, 18, 151-158.
Steele, C. M. ( 1988). The psychology ofself-affirmation: Sustaining
the integrity of the sel( Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology, 21, 261-302.
Strecher, V., McClure, J. B., Alexander, G. L., Chakraborty, B. Nair,
V N., Konkel, J, M .... & Pomerleau, O.F. (2008). Web-based
smoking-cessation programs: Results of a randomized trial.
American Journal ofPreventive Medicine, 34, 373-381.
Suls, J., & Green, P. (2003). Pluralistic ignorance and college
student perceptions of gender-specific alcohol norms. Health
Psychology, 22, 479-486.
Suls, ]., Luger, T., & Martin, R. (2010). The biopsychosocial
model and use of theory in health psychology. In J. M.
Suls, K. W. Davidson, & R. M. Kaplan (Eds). Handbook
of health psychology and behavioral medicine (pp. 15-30).
New York: Guilford Press.
Suls, ],, Martin, R., & Wheeler, L. (2000), Three kinds of opinion comparison: The Triadic Model. Personality & Social
Psychology Review, 4, 219-237.
Suls, ]., Martin, R., & Wheeler, L. (2002), Social comparison: Why, with whom and with what effect? Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 159-163.

COMPARISON & PERSUASION

Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. {1981). The framing of decisions
and the psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453-458.
Uskul, A. K., & Oyserman, D. {2010), When message frarne
fits salient cultural-frame, messages feel more persuasive
Psychology & Health, 25, 321-337.
·
Uskul, A. K., Sherman, D., & Fitzgibbon, J, (2009). The cultural congruency effect: Culture, regulatory focus and the
clfoctivcncss of gain-loss fmmcd health messages, Journal of
fapcrimdlltfll Soci11l Ps)'chology, 45, 535-541.
Van der Zee, K., Oldersma, F., Buunk, B. & Bos, D. (1998),
Social comparison preferences among cancer patients as
related to neuroticism and social comparison orientation,
Journal ofPersonality & Social Psychology, 75, 801--810,
Wheeler, L., Martin, R., & Suls, J. (1997). The proxy social
comparison model for self-assessment of ability. Personality

& Social Psychology Review, l, 54-61.
Wheeler, L. & Miyake, K. (1992). Social comparison in every.
day life. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 62,
760-733.
Wheeler, L., & Suls, J, (2005). Social comparison and
self-evaluations of cpmpetence. In A. Elliot & C,
Dweck (Eds.), Handbook of competence and motivation
(pp. 566-578). New York: Guilford Press.
Wheeler, L. & Suls, J, (2007). Assimilation in social comparison:
Can we agree on what it is? International Review ofPsychology,
20, 31-51.
Witte, K. (1992), Putting the fear back into fear appeals: The
extended parallel processing model. Communications
Monogmphs, 59, 329-349.
Witte, K., & Allen, M. (2000), A meta-analysis of feat
appeals: Implications for effective public health campaigns.
Health Education & Behavior, 27, 591-615.
Wills, T. A. (1981). Downward comparison principles in social
psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 90, 245-271.
Wood,]. V (1996). What is social comparison and how should
we study it? Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 22,
520-537.
Wood,]. V, Taylor, S. E., & Lichtman,' R. (1985). Social comparison in adjustment to breast cancer. Journal ofPersonality
& Social Psychology, 49, 1169-1183.

